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A   by joining scraps from other authors”: this is 
how Samuel Johnson defines the cento in his Dictionary, a definition that 
then joins scraps quoted from other authors like Pope, for particularly fit-
ting illustrations of the word’s usage. 3is essay examines the genre of the 
cento in the period when new editions of Johnson’s Dictionary began to 
outlive him: the Romantic period, a period marked—like ours—by historic 
change in the regulation of copyright. I will proceed first by sketching the 
current status and outlining a brief history of copyright, which Jeffrey 
Galin glosses as a “limited monopoly of rights […] designed to balance the 
needs of creators to make a reasonable return on their works and inven-
tions for a limited period of time, with the work then turning toward the 
public domain to serve as fodder for the development of future creative 
works” ().
3is outline of copyright history will include a discussion of fair dealing, 
a copyright law exemption for users’ rights that seeks to counterbalance 
those of copyright holders; fair dealing has important bearing on my argu-
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ment as it concerns appropriation in cultural production. 3e essay then 
details the cento, in its supplementary relation to Romantic literature and 
ideology, and its complex relationship to creativity and criticism. In the 
process, salutary and symptomatic examples of the cento’s use by Wil-
liam Hazlitt and William Wordsworth will be considered, two authors 
well known as major proponents, in their time, of the Romantic ideology 
of cultural production as original creation (McGann ), as opposed to 
Augustan and postmodern theories of cultural production as imitation and 
bricolage. Hazlitt’s and Wordsworth’s uses of the cento illustrate the con-
stitutive contradiction between copyright’s rationale and the materialities 
of cultural production; their uses also suggest prototypical models of fair 
dealing, avant la lettre, as both a user’s right and a resource for authorship. 
3e essay concludes by considering the implications of the cento under 
the copyright regime of English Romanticism for appropriative art and 
scholarship under today’s globalized regime. 
As a genre of poetry composed entirely of quotations from other 
poems, the cento makes an interesting study for Romanticism and copy-
right: it flies in the face of Romantic tradition, it shows how copyright 
conditions the possibilities of cultural production, and it points up the 
contradiction between the cultural-legal hegemony of originality and the 
material processes of appropriation-based production. 3e point is not 
that the cento is popular or pivotal to English literature but, instead, that it 
poses a Derridean supplement to this literature and its prevailing Roman-
tic ideology, an ideology that, as Robert Macfarlane suggests, “continues 
to prosper in the literary-cultural consciousness. If anything, indeed, it is 
more unshiftably ensconced there than two hundred years ago, when it 
is generally taken to have been devised” (). 
A study of the cento and Romanticism has timely implications for copy-
right and cultural production today, in the context of a digitized media 
ecology of content abundance and the ensuing global “copyfight” over 
regulating this new mediascape. As Swedish Pirate Party founder Rick 
Falkvinge has argued, and as the worldwide January  protest over 
the U.S.’s Stop Online Piracy Act () made clear, this copyfight pits an 
increasingly draconian copyright regime not against commercial piracy 
but against civil liberties. Today’s copyfight is a techno-cultural front in 
the class war, being waged on the  percent by the predominantly cor-
porate copyright holders among the  percent, who deploy both repres-
sive instruments and ideological strategies drawn from Romanticism. 
Appealing to the Romantic figure of individual, expressive authorship is 
a rhetorical weapon of choice for copyright maximalist interests which 
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are—it is important to stress—not individual creators, for the most part, 
but corporations (Marshall –). So this essay refers to ideas of Romanti-
cism and authorship that may seem old-fashioned to scholars versed in 
theoretical and historicist interrogations of them; however, these ideas 
still hold formidable popular purchase thanks to the culture industry’s 
“adapted Romanticism” (Adorno para ). As Paul Saint-Amour observes, 
“the Romantic cult of the individual genius […] has proven both durable 
and adaptable” (), and it has become a standard, disingenuous justifi-
cation for corporate lobbying and litigation against both the expansion 
of appropriation art forms (including user-generated content) and the 
exercise of users’ rights like fair dealing to protect and promote such art 
forms, not to mention criticism and education too. While recent court 
cases in Canada and the U.S. have been decided emphatically in favour 
of users’ rights, there are a number of corporate agreements, regulatory 
and legislative efforts, and trade talks, as well as terms and techniques 
determining device and content use, that heavily tilt the scales of today’s 
global copyright regime in favour of rights holders. For understanding 
these present transformations, possibilities, and imperilments of culture 
and knowledge production, the history of earlier appropriation art and 
copyright regulation affords a fair deal of illumination.
A Short History of Copyright and Fair Dealing 
Copyright pretend[s] that every work of art is an invention 
distinctive enough to be patented.[…] Poetry can only be made 
out of other poems; novels out of other novels. All this was 
much clearer before the assimilation of literature to private 
enterprise concealed so many of the facts of criticism. (Frye 
–)
From the advent of print in the fifteenth century to the late eighteenth 
century, the copyright or intellectual property () regime in England can 
be summarized as a long period of increasing monopoly over published 
print works by an increasingly organized and regulated London publishing 
industry. In  the Stationers’ Company was incorporated in London as 
the print industry’s intermediary; it registered all printed works, enforced 
intellectual property customs, and organized its members into a privi-
leged and powerful cartel. 3e state licensed and guaranteed perpetual 
monopoly rights in printed texts to the printer-publishers that produced 
them, and the state pre-censored all print publications. In  a state 
licensing system supplanted that of royally conferred privileges. In the 
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Restoration, state pre-censorship tightened, but the mid-century Licensing 
Act lapsed in , leaving the Stationers’ Company to privately regulate 
its members’ practices until, in , Parliament passed copyright legisla-
tion, the Statute of Anne. 3e statute reassigned copyright from a work’s 
publisher to its author and limited its term to fourteen years, renewable 
once if the author outlived its expiry. 3e Statute of Anne enabled “the 
simultaneous emergence in legal discourse of the proprietary author and 
the literary work […] two concepts […] bound to each other” (Rose ). 
Despite the statute’s clear terms and recognition of authorship, the London 
publishers continued to claim perpetual copyright, which was upheld in 
English courts by injunctions against infringers who tried to reprint osten-
sibly out-of-copyright works; in contrast, Scottish law upheld the statute’s 
limited term. Tensions and legal actions between English and Scottish 
publishers culminated in , when, in Donaldson v. Becket, the House of 
Lords affirmed the statute and declared perpetual copyright claims illegal.
3at decision stimulated a competitive market in old, “public domain” 
texts: prices fell, sales rose, and readerships grew. For new print works, 
though, prices rose sharply, to exploit their “brief copyright window” of 
statutory protection: prices for popular modern authors like Scott, Byron, 
and Landon were so high that the buying of books and even the renting 
of books from circulating libraries remained a luxury reserved for the 
wealthy: “A parliamentary inquiry of  reported that books were more 
expensive at that time than they had ever been in the history of British 
books” (St Clair ). 3is “brief copyright window”—as William St Clair 
calls this period of short-term copyright protection for newly published 
works ()—lasted until , when the statutory copyright term was 
doubled. In  the term was unconditionally extended to twenty-eight 
years or the author’s life, whichever was longer. And from  the lobby-
ing of publishers and authors like Wordsworth and Dickens culminated in 
the  Copyright Act that effectively closed the brief copyright window 
and re-established long copyright. 3e  act significantly extended the 
term of copyright protection to forty-two years from publication or, if the 
author was still alive thereafter, to seven years after the author’s death 
(Zall ). Since the early nineteenth century, the history of copyright has 
largely been about further lengthening it and internationalizing it, first in 
agreements among specific territories and later formalized globally in the 
 Berne Convention (St Clair ).
In the U.S. and Europe, the term is the author’s life plus seventy years. 
Copyright in Canada currently protects a work for fifty years after the 
author’s death, but Canada has long faced persistent pressure from U.S. 
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trade interests to lengthen the copyright term (Geist, “Leaks”) and to 
toughen copyright generally, which (as of this writing) the Harper gov-
ernment is doing by signing Canada to copyright-maximizing trade deals 
like the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement () with the 
, as well as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (), and by including in the 
copyright amendment act, Bill -, technology-specific provisions that 
favour rights holders over content users (a development that will be revis-
ited in closing). 3e globalized maximalism of copyright’s new enclosures 
produces what James Boyle calls “corporate welfare” (–), entrenching the 
monopolistic dominance of a very few massively concentrated, conglom-
erate rights-holders, based in the U.S. and, to a lesser extent, in western 
Europe. As the Worldmapper project shows, “this means that a few people 
living in less than a tenth of the territories in the world […] receive the 
US billion of net export earnings for these services” (Newman et al). 
For the sake of contrast, the next closest intellectual property exporters 
U.S. are the  (with . billion in net  exports) and France (with 
. billion). Yet economic evidence does not justify the extraordinary 
copyright maximalism sought in global trade talks and legislation today. 
Andrew Gowers’s  report on  for the  Treasury cites both the 
s term extension debate and postmillennial economic studies to con-
clude “that the length of protection for copyright works already far exceeds 
the incentives required to invest in new works,” that “the optimal length of 
copyright is at most seven years,” and “that the extra incentives to create 
as a result of term extension are likely to be very small beyond a term of 
 years” (). 3e economic evidence suggests that the architects of the 
 Statute of Anne, with its fourteen-year copyright term, may have had 
the right idea all along in limiting copyright term to something more like 
a decade than a century.
Another crucial aspect of copyright history concerns its stakeholders. 
Despite the  statute’s turn to an emphasis on authorship, copyright 
before and since has tended to reflect more the economic interests of 
corporate concerns—publishers, printers, record labels, and film studios—
than those of individual authors and artists. Until the mid-nineteenth 
century, an author sold her or his right to copy a work outright, to a 
publisher, for a fixed sum; the royalty system, in which the author earns 
marginal income on every copy sold, commenced in  with a novel 
contract between Elizabeth Gaskell and Chapman and Hall (Saunders ). 
Writers have since come to rely on royalty income; however, music and 
film copyrights tend to be corporately held, hence the ironic disingenuous-
ness of “Big Content” companies and lobbies making appeals on behalf 
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of romanticized “creators” (whom Big Content companies themselves 
routinely exploit, but that’s another story [see Masnick, “How Sony”]).
3e Romantic period thus started during the first opening of the Eng-
lish public domain and ended amidst new enclosures of this domain. For 
discussing the cento, a crucial detail of copyright in the period concerns its 
control of quotation and adaptation. St Clair shows that before , Eng-
lish print culture teemed with “anthologies, abridgements, and adaptations 
[…] verse miscellanies [… and] collections of short quotations […] known 
as sententiae, or in English ‘select sentences’ ” (–). But “after , for 
about  years we find only a handful of newly compiled printed collec-
tions of quotations of English literature” (). St Clair reads this change as 
a clampdown by the London print cartel on any and all appropriation of 
published texts—the cartel’s privately held intellectual properties—and he 
documents suggestive evidence that, after about , “a regime intended 
to control the use of quotations from printed books unauthorized by the 
intellectual property owners [was] being put in place” ().
3e clampdown on quotation and adaptation was checked somewhat 
by a  case, Gyles v. Wilcox, which ruled in favour of the defendant’s 
adaptation of Gyles’s text as a practice of “fair abridgment” (Rose ) and 
provided the first of several precedents for fair dealing in copyright law. 
Fair dealing (whose U.S. counterpart is the more expansive fair use) is 
a limit on the copyright holder’s exclusive rights to a work (Boyle ), 
a recognition that “not all copying should be considered infringement” 
(Hartnett ), as in study, teaching, or criticism. In Canadian law, fair 
dealing is an exception to copyright for users to, within limits, reproduce 
copyrighted works, without permission or payment, for specified purposes, 
like research, study, criticism, review, reporting, and parody (Athabasca ). 
An  case in the U.S., Folsom v. Marsh, first formulated the principle of 
fair use and formalized the practical “tests” for determining whether or not 
a given use of copyrighted material is fair. Fair dealing was first ensconced 
in  legislation in  and in Canada in  (Katz). Recent landmark 
Supreme Court decisions  and  have established and entrenched 
a “large and liberal” understanding of research and a correspondingly 
capacious interpretation of fair dealing. 3e decision also codified six 
tests for assessing the fairness of a given “dealing” (or re-use), according 
to the purpose, character, amount, nature, and effect of the work, and in 
consideration of alternatives to the dealing ( ). 
Turning back to the late eighteenth century, we also see that the open-
ing of the “brief copyright window” ended the long clampdown on quota-
tion and adaptation, at least for the older texts it released into the public 
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domain. “[T]he moment that the restrictions on reprinting extracts from 
certain older texts were lifted in ,” writes St Clair, “we see a flood of 
verse and prose anthologies compiled almost entirely from those printed 
literary texts which were then released into the public domain” ( empha-
sis added).
3e cento belongs to a constellation of appropriative, curatorial genres 
like anthologies, abridgments, and adaptations that, in St Clair’s long his-
torical view, have withered under more restrictive or maximalist copyright 
regimes, like that of the late sixteenth century to the late eighteenth, and 
bloomed under weaker or minimalist regimes, like that of the Romantic 
period, when the effects of the earlier Donaldson v. Becket case in  
became felt as an “explosion of reading” driven by a “revival of the types 
of printed text which had been discouraged after : abridgements, 
adaptations and, above all, anthologies” (; see also ). 
While reprints of older, public domain works boomed, appropria-
tions and adaptations of newer, protected works were discouraged and 
suppressed. Because of the strong copyright protection of newer works, 
modern literature was for the rich, while the rest were confined to the 
“old canon”—rich in tradition but also “increasingly obsolete” (St Clair 
). However, a workaround to access modern literature emerged in the 
period revival of the early modern commonplace book or “album”: a do-
it-yourself, manuscript compilation of literary excerpts (in which Scott 
and Byron figured prominently). Some albums were sold publicly; others 
were kept privately, sometimes passed on as heirlooms (). In the s, 
pre-selected print albums began to compete with and displace the do-it-
yourself albums: “For the readerly freedom to control the texts to be reread 
[…] was substituted the confinement of receiving a commercially produced 
gift whose texts had already been pre-selected and pre-censored” (). 
In addition, protective publishers in the London cartel that could not 
successfully rely on the custom of perpetual copyright found that they 
could exploit legal ambiguities over “originality.” To extend the term of 
copyrights due to expire, some publishers printed “special” or sparingly 
revised editions; some smaller publishers printed anthologies of quota-
tions taken, at a remove, from periodicals (). As the Scottish Lord Hailes 
complained of such devices in , “the London booksellers enlarge the 
common-law right by conferring the name of original author on every 
tasteless compiler” (quoted in Rose ). Mark Rose (among others) notes 
how that practice has continued to the present: “In the discourse of copy-
right [….] the goal of protecting the rights of the creative author is proudly 
asserted even as the notion of author is drained of content” ().
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As the ability of enterprising upstart publishers to compile copyright-
able works from periodical excerpts suggests, the legal status of excerpting 
in reviews was an uncertain issue:
3e eighteenth-century literary reviews […] saw their main 
role as providing summaries of new books and often included 
substantial extracts. In , quotations took up over half of 
the articles.[…] But this loophole was closing. 3e advancing 
intellectual property law and custom not only forbade antholo-
gies and abridgements but quotations in reviews that were 
thought long enough to undermine sales. (–)
Some reviews pointedly tried to hurt sales this way: Shackell’s Register 
reprinted most of Hazlitt’s  Liber Amoris “in eighteen closely printed 
columns of selections,” notes Hazlitt’s biographer Stanley Jones, “ma[king] 
it hardly necessary to lay down money to read it” ().
Perhaps the most dramatic demonstration of the period’s minimal but 
inconsistent copyright regime was in the legal withholding of copyright 
from works deemed seditious or obscene. Ruled by the courts as ineli-
gible for copyright, the radical play Wat Tyler () proliferated in pirate 
editions that could not be legally suppressed by its embarrassed author, 
the poet laureate Robert Southey (Perillo –). Radical and pirate pub-
lishers quickly moved to publish similarly uncopyrightable works, like 
Lord Byron’s Don Juan () and Percy Shelley’s Queen Mab (), and 
the copyright law that provided strong “textual controls” for state pre-
publication censorship (St Clair ) backfired spectacularly, propagating 
a “radical canon” of modern, subversive literature that was rapidly dis-
seminated across England and among different classes ().
3e brief copyright window that conditioned Romantic literary pro-
duction is thus characterized by contradiction and inconsistency. Perpet-
ual copyright was illegal, but many publishers continued to claim it until 
at least the s (). Publishers prosecuted infringers, pirates, and gen-
erous quoters to defend their monopolies on original texts, but they also 
sometimes needed to vitiate the definition of originality to sustain copy-
right protection. Entrepreneurial writers and publishers also exploited the 
low legal threshold of “originality” to publish and copyright anthologies 
and other mainly or strictly intertextual works, provided they did not deal 
with works still in copyright; the law held no fair dealing exemption. And 
ironically—as has been more recently argued of Disney’s turn from appro-
priation (Lessig ) to litigation ()—those authors producing new works, 
whose copyrights their publishers jealously protected, were beneficiaries 
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of a new and burgeoning public domain, which supplied their work with 
an old canon (of Milton, Shakespeare, etc.) from which they borrowed 
allusions, tropes, plots, and other literary elements (Macfarlane ). 3e 
explosion of reading, the commodification of appropriative, intertextual 
forms, and the unresolved legal status of periodical quotation illustrate 
both the limits and opportunities of copyright as a legal foundation for 
cultural production both amateur and professional. Which brings us to 
the cento, a curious supplement to the Romantic period’s curious copy-
right regime.
 
“Masterworks of tastelessness” 
Authors do not really create in any literal sense, but rather 
produce texts through complex processes of appropriation 
and transformation. (Rose )
3e cento is a genre with roots in antiquity (Okáčová ). 3e Roman poet 
Ausonius formalized rules for composing a cento in the fourth century, 
establishing the genre as a form of poetry: lines lifted from Homer, Vir-
gil, and the Bible and reworked as sacred Christian verse or as bawdy 
satire. 3e cento variously pays homage to, parodies, and/or perverts its 
source texts, recontextualizing its borrowings by finding new connections 
for them with equally recontextualized lines from other works. Wholly 
intertextual and structurally ironic—expecting its readers to recognize 
its sources and delight in their détournement—a traditional cento is its 
own generic mash-up: it looks like a lyric, but the apparent identity of its 
voice masks its technically dramatic or dialogic composition as a collage 
of different voices. In its ancient and early modern career it was widely 
read as a poetic form of satire; in the eighteenth century, both its forms 
and its functions became more varied. As a strictly intertextual collage 
form, the cento prefigures the visual collages of Victorian and Dada art-
ists, the “cut-up” poetry of Dada and Beat poets, the dub and remix pro-
cesses of  culture (among other “prospects of recording,” as Glenn Gould 
mused []), and the sample-saturated digital mediascape of mash-ups 
and aggregators, in which “everything is a remix” (see Ferguson and Ruth-
erford). As a transformative and critical use of quotations from creative 
works, the cento also has implications for citation in scholarship, which 
will be considered in closing.
Saint-Amour calls the cento “the ultimate neoclassical form” and notes 
that it “thrived during the eighteenth century and continued in the early 
nineteenth”: an  cento repurposed Latin verse to celebrate Nelson (); 
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an homage to Shakespeare, “Formed from his Works,” celebrated his birth-
day in  (). 3rough the nineteenth century, the cento (also known 
as “mosaic” or “patchwork” poetry) kept its poetic basis, but it also became 
adapted to prose. An anonymous  long prose cento lampooned the 
Scottish minister Edward Irving, taking the form of a mock court case. 
A  conduct book, !e Cento: Being a Collection of Choice Extracts, 
from the Most Approved Authors; Chiefly designed for the Instruction of 
young Persons, is also anonymous, suggesting that its producers perhaps 
sought to evade prosecution for infringement. One  cento, to which 
we will return, borrowed pointedly from Wordsworth—a major lobbyist 
for copyright maximalism in his day—in order to lampoon said lobbying, 
which resulted that year in the more maximalist Copyright Act. By , 
Charles Bombaugh could define the cento more expansively as “a work 
wholly composed of verses, or passages promiscuously taken from other 
authors and disposed in a new form or order, so as to compose a new work 
and a new meaning” (quoted in Saint-Amour –, emphasis added).
Since antiquity, the cento has drawn derision: for its perceived dis-
respect of sources, for its pedantry, and for its derivative, seemingly 
mechanical form (Okáčová ). 3e latter criticisms became pronounced 
in the Romantic period, when, as Macfarlane argues, the turn from Augus-
tan aesthetics (signaled for instance by Edward Young’s  Conjectures 
upon Original Composition), the emergence of more individualized and 
democratized forms of subjectivity, and new efficiencies of mass produc-
tion (as well, I would add, as the period’s copyright regime) all condi-
tioned Romanticism’s “increased admiration of literary originality” (). 
3e proliferation of older public domain works and newer pirated ones, in 
multiple editions by multiple publishers, indicated new technologies and 
policies that occasioned a kind of “crisis of authenticity” in literature, “the 
anxiety that indebted work was in some way equivalent to the unthinking 
reproduction of machines” (). 3omas Carlyle’s  “Signs of the Times” 
remains one of the most symptomatic statements of this techno-cultural 
anxiety: “Literature, too, has its Paternoster-row mechanism, its Trade-
dinners, its Editorial conclaves, and huge subterranean, puffing bellows; 
so that books are not only printed, but, in a great measure, written and 
sold, by machinery” (para ). 
On the shift in aesthetics and its impact on the cento, Reiner Her-
zog writes, “It was only after Romanticism and Historicism had propa-
gated the originality and unique historicity of the artwork, and after 
literary historical positivism in the late nineteenth century revis-
ited the tradition of the Cento on their premises, that general dis-
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regard of the form developed” ( n).¹ As a critical verdict repre-
sentative of this growing disregard, Herzog quotes a modern French 
description of the cento as a “masterwork of tastelessness” ( n). 
     While denigrating an author as a “centonist” in the period was to 
judge her or his work as unoriginal, producing a cento was to signal the 
producer’s aﬄuence and command of literary resources and capital. As 
Saint-Amour suggests, “cento-making [was] necessarily an activity for the 
leisured classes. In its nineteenth-century resurgence, the cento enabled 
the members of this prime readerly demographic to write back through 
[…] reading, to produce a literature of extravagant consumption” (–). 
For example, a thirty-eight-line cento from  was “said to have occupied 
a year’s laborious search among the voluminous writings of thirty-eight 
leading poets” (Dobson quoted in Saint-Amour ); after all, this was 
long before Google. 3e sense of work invested being disproportionate 
to the quality of the final product contributed to the cento’s dismissal as 
“laborious trifling” (): the work of dabblers, not authors.
But while the cento represents “a counterdiscourse to Romantic 
authorship” (Saint-Amour ), it also exemplifies (like the album) the 
period’s commodification of appropriative forms. Toward the closing of 
the brief copyright window, during the transition from Regency to Vic-
torian rule, the threshold of “originality” required to secure protection 
under copyright law was low enough that anthologists, compilers, and 
even centonists could get copyright protection for their largely or exclu-
sively intertextual works (Rose , St Clair ). Saint-Amour relegates 
to a footnote this rather surprising upshot of the period’s minimal but 
inconsistent copyright regime:
Although neither the cento nor the [album] is “fresh” in the 
Romantic sense of radically original, both meet copyright’s 
more modest standards of originality […] Both genres belong 
to the category of works that are at once “derivative” of 
antecedent works and eligible for the copyright protection 
accorded “original” works. While none of these texts’ verbatim 
inclusions of protected works was itself copyright in its new 
context, the aggregate recombination (e.g. the whole cento 
[…]) was protected. (Saint-Amour  n)
3at is, despite its “mosaic” composition of more or less openly appropri-
ated lines from other poets, the cento’s new sequencing supplied sufficient 
 I am grateful to Anne Korn for translating this quotation from the original Ger-
man.
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originality to qualify it as a new work, eligible for copyright protection, 
depending on the public-domain or protected status of its source mate-
rial. 3is kind of protection had been established by the  decision on 
“fair abridgement” and amidst the legal actions that led up to the outlaw of 
perpetual copyright in , but it had also been established by the Lon-
don print cartel’s own exploitations of legal ambiguities over “originality.”
3e imitative, repetitive cento, then, both countered and exploited the 
Romantic discourse and legal institution of creative authorship, with their 
linked premises in “property, originality, personality” (Rose ). Com-
posing centos went hand in hand with compiling commonplace books: it 
was for aficionados and amateurs, not for professional authors, although 
it could sometimes prove publishable. 
Hazlitt’s “bricolage of quotations” 
No one, whether author or intellectual property owner, can 
reasonably claim that any substantial text has been compiled 
solely from privately owned materials. (St Clair )
3e radical essayist William Hazlitt was a “key figure controlling the trans-
mission of the idea of literary originality” in the period (Macfarlane ), 
as exemplified in his literary lectures and his collection of essays on con-
temporary cultural and political figures, !e Spirit of the Age (). 3e 
text demonstrates both the status of the cento in relation to the nascent 
Romantic ideology and the form’s increasing adaptation to prose. For 
instance, of the novels of anarchist philosopher William Godwin, Hazlitt 
writes approvingly that “there is no look of patch-work and plagiarism, 
the beggarly copiousness of borrowed wealth” (). Hazlitt’s portraits 
of Lord Byron, the lawyer James Mackintosh, and William Wordsworth 
are especially noteworthy for their references to the cento. Writing of 
Byron, Hazlitt criticizes the poet’s style as too self-absorbed, and figures 
his productions as paradoxically solipsistic centos: “Lord Byron makes 
man after his own image, woman after his own heart; […] he gives us the 
misanthrope and the voluptuary by turns; and with these two characters, 
burning or melting in their own fires, he makes out everlasting centos of 
himself” (Spirit ).
To James Mackintosh’s Lectures on the Law of Nature and Nations, 
Hazlitt gives some suggestively faint praise: they “were after all but a kind 
of philosophical centos. 3ey were profound, brilliant, new to his hearers; 
but the profundity, the brilliancy, the novelty were not his own” (Spirit 
). Ironically, Hazlitt mentions the cento first to criticize Byron’s poetry 
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for being too original and then to critique Mackintosh’s lectures for not 
being original enough. 
More ironically, while the content of Hazlitt’s essays denigrates the 
cento in references like these, their form deploys it, thus articulating some-
thing of the contradiction between literary production and its regulation. 
As a “bricolage of quotations” (Paulin, Day-Star ), Hazlitt’s prose style 
“melts down not raw, but already processed material into a new and beauti-
ful shape.” According to Tom Paulin, “the essay as cento, as a patchwork of 
quotations, [is] part of the deep structure of Hazlitt’s imagination” (“Intro-
duction” xi), a reading echoed by David Chandler, as Paulin’s co-editor of 
Penguin’s single-volume Hazlitt selection, !e Fight and Other Writings. 
Introducing the volume’s notes, Chandler discusses how Hazlitt not only 
“quoted compulsively” but also “freely adapted the material he was quot-
ing,” and only rarely cited it. “3e problem for the annotator,” Chandler 
reflects, “is knowing when to stop” (). A close reading of even just 
this one representative volume’s notes reveals interesting patterns and 
preferences in Hazlitt’s quotation practice. 3e majority of his quota-
tions are from Shakespeare (Chandler ), and many others are from 
public domain writers like Milton; however, Hazlitt also quotes extensively 
from the copyrighted works of his own contemporaries, including Byron, 
Coleridge, Keats, Scott, and Wordsworth. 
Returning to Hazlitt’s portrait of Byron, for example, its first two pages 
alone include five explicit quotations: quoting Coriolanus (to great ironic 
effect), Hazlitt writes that Byron
holds no communion with his kind; but stands alone, with-
out mate or fellow -
 “As if a man were author of himself,
      And owned no other kin.” (Spirit )
Hazlitt’s image of Byron is that of a modern “centonist,” an image ironically 
composed in cento-like fashion itself, in a wry juxtaposition of originality 
and imitation, “extreme ambition of novelty” and “charges of plagiarism”: 
Byron, Hazlitt writes, “takes the thoughts of others (whether contempo-
raries or not) out of their mouths, and is content to make them his own, 
to set his stamp upon them” (). Is Hazlitt perhaps protesting too much? 
He quotes from his own contemporaries—never mind himself—as con-
tentedly as Byron might. His portrait of Wordsworth, for example, cites 
his subject author nine times and his own prior work twice. In the notes 
to !e Fight, not just Wordsworth but specific poems emerge as particular 
favourites for Hazlitt (as Paulin and Chandler produce him here, anyway): 
A close 
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specifically, !e Excursion (), “Ode on Intimations of Immortality” 
(), and “Lines Composed A Few Miles Above Tintern Abbey” (). 
Hazlitt quotes generous excerpts from Excursion and “Tintern Abbey” in 
his  lecture “On Shakespeare and Milton” (Fight –), enhancing 
the literary value of both “old canon” and contemporary writers alike in 
their cross-referential quotations that, as St Clair observes of appropria-
tive works, “perform the selecting, canonising, and memorialising role 
[…] which has often been seen as among [their] essential purposes and 
characteristics” (). 
To these purposes we might add that of fair dealing: Hazlitt’s frequent 
and adaptive quotation of his contemporaries prototypes the practice of 
repurposing copyrighted works, and in writing that has furnished some 
foundational statements on literary Romanticism, no less. He quotes often 
but never substantially enough to compromise a contemporary work’s 
commercial prospects and usually, instead, to promote the work, implicitly 
or explicitly. His quotation from “Tintern Abby” in “On Shakespeare and 
Milton” misquotes lines  to  of Wordsworth’s poem to attribute its 
“burthen of the mystery” not to a “blessed mood” but to “them,” his subject 
authors (Fight ). 3en again, sometimes this promotional quotation 
backfires, as in “My First Acquaintance with Poets” (), where Hazlitt 
credits Chaucer with a line from !e Excursion (). As will be discussed 
below, Wordsworth was very protective of his intellectual property, so it 
is telling that the historical record shows no legal actions between them 
(the kinds of actions to which Hazlitt was no stranger²); as will also be 
discussed, Wordsworth modeled fair dealing in his own way too. Hazlitt’s 
divergent statements on and uses of centonism, then, aptly illustrate the 
contradiction between Romantic cultural-legal discourse and Romantic 
literary production and point to the kind of appropriation we now rec-
ognize as fair dealing. 
 In addition to developing a cento-like style in his essays, Hazlitt also pursued 
larger-scale quoting and compiling work that, in one illustrative case, was 
thwarted for including work by his literary contemporaries. Hazlitt’s Select 
English Poets, or Elegant Extracts from Chaucer to the Present Time included 
work by contemporary writers like Wordsworth, Coleridge, Byron, Shelley, 
Keats, and Scott, for which reason it was no sooner printed than it was “rig-
orously suppressed” (Birrell quoted in Gates ). 3e book was suppressed 
in England, that is; as with many suppressed English works, the edition was 
shipped to the U.S. (which ignored and flouted foreign copyrights throughout 
most of the nineteenth century), where it “became widely known and highly 
regarded” while remaining “virtually unknown in England” (Gates –).
!e Cento, Romanticism, and Copyright | 
Appropriation as Creativity and Criticism 
Every poet is a thief. ()
Like Hazlitt’s liberal and adaptive prose centonism, the cento’s exhibition 
of judicious selection and sequencing illustrates that curation and edit-
ing are themselves profoundly creative writing processes. “3e derivative 
nature of the cento is all too obvious,” writes Zoja Pavolvskis; “what is not 
obvious is that the act of composing a cento is strikingly original” (). 
Contemporary legal support for this view recently arose at the Supreme 
Court of Canada (which has ruled consistently to keep an appropriate bal-
ance in copyright), in its  hearing of a fair dealing case, which included 
a discussion of appropriation in the creative process. As Michael Geist 
reports, Chief Justice McLachlin “noted that works often involve bringing 
together several other works into a new whole. When counsel responded 
that this was a compilation, the Chief Justice replied that it might actually 
be an entirely new work, bringing the issue of remix and transformative 
works to the Supreme Court of Canada” (“3e Supreme Court”).
T. S. Eliot—no stranger to the cento himself, as shown in !e Waste 
Land (Ricks quoted in Eliot, Inventions )—has made this case for lit-
erature more generally, in his comment that “immature poets imitate; 
mature poets steal […] 3e good poet welds his theft into a whole of feel-
ing which is unique” (Sacred Wood ). 3e widespread misquotation 
and misattribution of the comment lend it an irony that is amplified by 
the fact that Eliot’s literary estate is infamously antagonistic to scholarly 
citation of his work, whether licensed or in fair use (Galin ). Further 
amplifying this irony is the likeness to Eliot’s famous comment of the  
lyric quoted above, given ’s own copyright maximalism, from the  
Island Records v. SST Records case (see McCarvel) to lead singer Bono’s 
recent opinion column calling to renew the crackdown on file-sharing by 
targeting Internet service providers, “whose swollen profits,” he claims, 
“perfectly mirror the lost receipts of the music business.” 3ese reception 
contexts of Eliot’s writing and ’s music demonstrate the particularly 
strong copyright protection presently afforded to what the law terms 
creative or original works in contrast to the weaker protection afforded 
to factual or derivative works (Galin ). 3is reductive legal language 
might be understood as a sort of utilitarian variation on the Foucauldian 
distinction between primary and secondary orders of discourse; in addi-
tion, such language illustrates the Romantic premise of copyright law, in 
its privileging of originality and creativity.
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In light of such formal and legal distinctions, the cento—a remix of 
existing works at once derivative and unique—embodies an intertextual 
kind of creativity like that of parody. And parody is well understood to 
serve a critical function; as Linda Hutcheon points out in !e Poetics of 
Postmodernism, the “parodic intertextuality” of postmodern art some-
times critiques not just its source material but also copyright and cultural 
property, the “ideological and economic underpinnings to the idea of 
originality” (). Recognizing the cento as a parodic creative form means 
recognizing its critical function as commentary (Verweyen and Witting 
–). An appropriative cultural production, whether a cento, a collage, 
or even a  mix, becomes legible as criticism according to the principles 
of selection and organization that structure it (McCutcheon, “For the 
record”). 3e recognition of appropriation as criticism is well established 
in postmodernist and postcolonialist theories of readerly rewriting, repeti-
tion with difference, and counter-discourse and is gaining wider purchase 
in humanities and legal scholarship on copyright issues in appropriation 
art. Rebecca Tushnet argues that because sexuality is a possible interpre-
tation of original works that authors may not explicate, the sexualization 
of works constitutes a transformative use exposing a latent meaning; that 
is, it constitutes criticism (“My Fair Ladies” –). We find this form of 
appropriation as criticism, for example, in Elisa Kreisinger’s Queer Carrie 
project, which remixes Sex and the City footage, and in Jonathan McIn-
tosh’s “Buffy vs Edward (Twilight Remixed)”; both videos remix popular 
Hollywood television shows to challenge Hollywood’s heteronormative 
and patriarchal narratives and to promote fair use.³
3e cento thus stands as a precursor to such radically intertextual 
forms of cultural production and critique, which are as readily enabled by 
new media technologies as they are challenged by changing copyright laws. 
3e cento constitutes a kind of meta-genre that simultaneously, paradoxi-
cally subverts the principle of genre: the cento is a simulacrum of literature, 
cutting up literature to comment on it, blurring the boundaries between 
primary and secondary cultural forms.
Given the popular explosion of reading and the pitched periodical 
hostilities that characterized the Romantic period, the centos produced 
at that time often demonstrated the genre’s critical function. 3e anony-
mous “cento of criticism” on Irving makes the critical function abundantly 
clear, in the text’s title and its lengthy caricature of Irving’s “quackery” 
(Anonymous ). Similarly, the didactic  Cento calls attention both 
 I am grateful to Sarah Mann for the references to Tushnet and Kreisinger.
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to its pedagogical purpose and to its critical discernment, “in being able 
to select the good and useful from the pernicious and hurtful.” Signifi-
cantly, neither editors nor the “Most Approved Authors” are named; only 
the printer’s name provides any specific attribution, although the telling 
absence of the printer’s address hints that the book may be a piracy. 3e 
preface justifies the text’s anonymity and total lack of acknowledgement 
by alluding to the copyright regime: “It may not be amiss, perhaps, just 
to mention one thing […] the not mentioning the different authors, from 
whose works the following pieces are compiled. […] some of them were 
not known when this collection was made; owing to many of the pieces 
being extracted without noticing any of the authors, before there was 
any intention of making them public” (). 3at this cento articulates its 
compiler’s anxiety over possible infringement action—in what it says and, 
just as much, in what it doesn’t say—suggests that not all centos qualified 
for copyright protection. Even during the brief copyright window, printed 
works dealing in extensive adaptation and quotation appeared to enjoy 
inconsistent copyright at best, tempered by case-specific contingencies, 
business customs, and the dispositions and cultural capital of the compil-
ers and their sources’ authors alike.
In , the year of the term-extending Copyright Act, a satirical mis-
cellany called George Cruikshank’s Omnibus deployed the cento to great 
critical effect. 3e book includes a chapter called “Original Poetry,” attrib-
uted to “Sir Fretful Plagiary” (the name of the critic character in Richard 
Brinsley Sheridan’s  play !e Critic). 3e chapter consists of centos 
and commentary and in its lampoon of “originality” becomes legible as 
a retort to the copyright act, as Saint-Amour notes (). “!ese poems 
bear no resemblance to anything ever before offered to the public,” the com-
mentary claims, introducing the first of its “original” poems: “Ode to the 
Human Heart,” a cento of lines from both public-domain and protected 
works, including a pointed sample of “Intimations of Immortality” by 
Wordsworth, who had lobbied for years to win perpetual, posthumous 
copyright for authors. 3e first two stanzas read as follows:
Blind 3amyris, and blind Mæonides,
Pursue the triumph and partake the gale!
Drop tears as fast as the Arabian trees,
To point a moral or adorn a tale.
Full many a gem of purest ray serene,
3oughts that do often lie too deep for tears,
Like angels’ visits, few and far between,
Deck the long vista of departed years. ()
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3e commentary subverts its own claims to originality, and sharpens the 
satire, by adding a footnote to the first stanza that reads like a legal dis-
claimer, while repeating the original appropriation. 3e footnote feigns 
baﬄement that “the printer’s devil had taken upon himself to make the 
following additions to these lines,” then reprints the first stanza with par-
enthetical annotations that acknowledge the composition’s sources: “(Oh! 
it’s Dr Johnson),” reads the annotation added to the fourth line. “What does 
he mean?” the footnote rhetorically asks. “Does he mean to say he has ever 
met with any one of those lines before?” (). 3is chapter of the Omnibus 
deflates the discourse of original genius with its repetitious insistence on 
its centos’s “originality” and reasserts the intrinsic intertextuality of liter-
ary production. In one especially suggestive passage, the satire strikes at 
Wordsworthian claims to originality and Hazlitt’s misquotations alike, 
while also putting in question the originality of Eliot’s remark: arguing that 
too few modern poets “want that greatest art, the art to steal,” the com-
mentary “hold[s] that in all cases of literary borrowing, or robbery (for it 
comes to the same thing), it is ten million times better to rob or borrow 
without the least disguise, equivocation, or mutilation whatsoever. Take 
the line as you find it” ().
Wordsworth’s “favourite passages” 
3e possibility of pure origination makes possible the notion 
that language—that most public and publicly created of 
domains—can be privatized by an individual. (Macfarlane –)
But despite the flagrancy of the Omnibus’s provocation, Wordsworth could 
hardly complain of such sampling. Much has been written on Words- 
worth’s work for copyright reform; much less on his work as a published 
“centonist.” Susan Eilenberg calls Wordsworth’s interest in copyright “exces-
sive” (); it suggests both an obsession with literature’s profitability and 
a lack of business acumen. Wordsworth could not have easily afforded 
many of his own books (St Clair ). Yet he urged at least one acquain-
tance who had bought his work not to lend it (Eilenberg ), exerting a 
kind of physical rights management. He lobbied for perpetual copyright, 
arguing it would drive down book prices (Zall ), while publishers lob-
bied for it knowing that a longer copyright term would keep prices high 
(St Clair –).
And while Wordsworth professed the original genius of Romantic 
authorship, he was, as John Hayden shows, a writer well versed in appro-
priating an extensive repertoire of English literature. To illustrate the 
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“eclecticism” and “extent” of Wordsworth’s borrowings, Hayden composes 
his own cento out of the many references to poetic forbears that he finds 
in no less a touchstone than “Tintern Abbey.” Hayden’s comparison of 
the cento to “Tintern Abbey” counters the traditional reception both of 
Wordsworth “as preeminently a Romantic poet and of originality as pre-
eminently a Romantic virtue” (–). Moreover, as Hayden observes, 
Wordsworth himself published a cento in the  Yarrow Revisited volume.
According to Wordsworth’s “advertisement” to Yarrow, the book com-
piles “miscellaneous poems” initially intended for “interspers[ing]” in other 
selected or collected editions; instead, Wordsworth has gathered these 
into “a separate volume,” in “consideration of […] purchasers of his former 
works, who […] would have reason to complain if they could not procure 
[these pieces] without being obliged to re-purchase what they already 
possessed” (v). In other words, while Wordsworth had intended to release 
a new “best of” album that would include previously uncollected pieces, 
he instead gathered the latter into their own -sides album. 
In this book’s section called “Evening Voluntaries,” the ninth piece 
(“” ) is a cento, or as Wordsworth describes it, a “compilation” ():
IX.
3roned in the Sun’s descending car
What Power unseen diffuses far
3is tenderness of mind?
What Genius smiles on yonder flood?
What God in whispers from the wood
Bids every thought be kind? [Akenside ]
O ever pleasing Solitude,
Companion of the wise and good, [3omson ]
3y shades, thy silence, now be mine,
  3y charms my only theme;
My haunt the hollow cliff whose Pine
  Waves o’er the gloomy stream;
Whence the scared Owl on pinions grey
  Breaks from the rustling boughs,
And down the lone vale sails away
  To more profound repose! [Beattie –]
As Wordsworth says in the poem’s parenthetical preface, the poem joins 
“a fine stanza of Akenside,[…] with a still finer by Beattie, by a couplet of 
3omson” (). In the version shown here, I have added parenthetical cita-
tions of Wordsworth’s sources, so the reader may compare his borrowings 
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with the original works. 3e resulting compilation is a vesper mediation 
on solitude imbued with sublimity; in it, each quotation occupies a dif-
ferent place in Wordsworth’s sequence than that which it occupies in its 
original poem. Wordsworth joins two stanzas that are similar in rhythm 
and theme with an intervening couplet that sustains this rhythm while 
carrying forward the first stanza’s rhyme. Wordsworth borrows very mod-
estly from his sources, especially from 3omson, whose work was at the 
centre of the disputes that led to the outlawing of perpetual copyright in 
. Nevertheless, all these sources were technically in the period’s public 
domain, leaving him free to exploit them commercially without risking 
infringement.
His preface to the poem, however, still registers anxiety over potential 
infringement. 3e preface to “” reads as follows, and for our purposes 
it is perhaps of more interest than the poem itself:
For printing [“”], some reason should be given, as not a word 
of it is original: it is simply a fine stanza of Akenside, connected 
with a still finer by Beattie, by a couplet of 3omson. 3is 
practice, in which the author sometimes indulges, of linking 
together, in his own mind, favourite passages from different 
authors, seems in itself unobjectionable: but, as the publish-
ing such compilations might lead to confusion in literature, 
he should deem himself inexcusable in giving this specimen, 
were it not from a hope that it might open to others a harmless 
source of private gratification. (Wordsworth ) 
3e preface illustrates how the cento problematizes both Romanticism 
and copyright. Wordsworth defends “this practice […] of linking together 
[…] favourite passages” as an “unobjectionable” mental exercise; and he 
“excuses” its publication as a means to the “private” enjoyment of readers. 
Wordsworth denies the poem any originality, describing it as a private 
“indulgence” and as a “specimen” of possible “confusion in literature.” (Such 
confusion did later occur, in misattributions of 3omson’s “clichés” about 
nature to Wordsworth [St Clair ].) His preface affirms the cento genre’s 
function as an unclearly primary and secondary form, even as literary 
criticism: Wordsworth judges Beattie’s stanza as “finer” than Akenside’s 
and, in appropriating these “favourite passages” from all three authors, 
in this way promotes them, activating the cento’s canon-forming func-
tion in both private and public terms. Wordsworth’s preface encodes the 
arguments that he (together with politicians like 3omas Noon Talfourd) 
would more explicitly make for stronger copyright: arguments on behalf 
of imaginative literature and its value to the nation (Vanden Bossche ).
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But in “hoping” the work would produce “private gratification,” the 
preface also encodes the arguments that opponents of the  Copyright 
Act would make: on behalf of useful knowledge and its value to the pub-
lic interest (). In addressing copyright, the preface justifies the poem’s 
publication by speculating on its private value to readers, “private” not 
as “property” but as what we’d now call “personal, non-commercial” use. 
3is makes for a curious disavowal of the commodity status of the printed 
cento itself, an object of commercial profit to Wordsworth justified for 
the non-commercial pleasure it might afford the reader who pays for it.
3e resulting contradictions between public and private in Words-
worth’s rationale show the pressure copyright exerts over literary pro-
duction: as is made explicit here, this cento, like the whole institution of 
copyright, “stands squarely on the boundary between private and public” 
(Rose ). 3e preface demonstrates Wordsworth’s preoccupation with 
copyright, in its conscientious acknowledgements and its anxiety over 
“publishing such compilations” at a time when compilations and quotations 
held uncertain and contested copyright status. In the process, the preface 
and the poem, taken together, comprise a prototype for what would later 
be recognized as fair dealing. Wordsworth justifies his “prey[ing] … on 
the Leaves of ancient Authors” (Pope) as a service to readers and a duty 
to posterity.
Contrary to more cursory surveys of Romantic attitudes to the cento, 
then, period writers display not a straightforward rejection of the genre 
but, rather, a more ambivalent and contradictory disavowal of it; both 
Hazlitt and Wordsworth sometimes reject it, sometimes exploit it. Simi-
larly, Macfarlane finds more ambivalence and diversity among Romantic 
writers over the definition of originality, arguing that this ambiguity and 
diversity are only simplified and homogenized into “Romantic ideology” in 
the Victorians’ retroactive, “selective editing” and construction of Roman-
ticism (). Given the growing maximalism of copyright since , we 
might understand the broader Victorian construction of Romanticism 
(Faflak and Wright ) as a production of cultural history conditioned by a 
consolidating and expanding copyright regime. 3e same period whose 
ascendant ideology of authorial originality demoted the cento to sub-
literary status is that whose fraught copyright regime cultivated the revival 
of this and similar appropriative genres (St Clair ).
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Rights Holders and Users’ Rights 
3ere is no such thing as an autonomous text or an origi-
nal genius that can transcend history. (Hutcheon A !eory of 
Adaptation )
Late Romanticism reveals an instructive moment of copyright regime 
change: a moment on the cusp of the first of significant and still-continuing 
copyright term extensions; a moment on the cusp of the formalization 
of fair dealing; a moment rich with literary forms that demonstrate the 
contradictions of copyright (sometimes sensationally, as in the Wat Tyler 
affair). 3e cento genre in the Romantic period represents a literary prec-
edent for fair dealing and for later cut-up, mixed-up, and mashed-up cul-
tural forms; it also provides an object lesson in how copyright regulation 
contradictorily conditions cultural production, determining its acceptable 
forms, its very possibilities. 3e cento points up contradictions between 
the practices and regulation of literary production that can illuminate the 
stakes of the current copyfight and help us as scholars to recognize and 
reflect on our own positions in this copyfight. 
3e long trend, since the late Romantic period, toward more copyright 
maximalism impacts critics and scholars, especially those who investigate 
creative works like art and literature, since creative works are more strongly 
protected by copyright than factual works. 3is trend is producing several 
chill effects over how we conduct such investigations. One of the most 
pervasive of these effects is simply the loaded character of public discourse 
on copyright, which corporate rights owners dominate with language that 
best serves their interests; thus, we frequently refer to digital copying as 
“piracy,” although most digital copying purposes are non-piratical (Les-
sig ). Another effect is the tightening restriction on how scholars use 
quoted material, restriction imposed by publishers, literary estates, and 
sometimes even disciplinary organizations. Publishers normally request 
scholarly authors to minimize or just exclude quotations of creative works; 
as David Orr notes, the fees asked by rights holders for poetry excerpts 
can fluctuate wildly. At the  congress panel on scholarly publishing, 
one university press representative put the matter bluntly: “If you want to 
quote song lyrics or a poem in your book, I’ve got one word for you: don’t.” 
By way of offering an example, the representative mentioned that two lines 
of a Bob Dylan song could cost  in permission fees. 3e American 
Psychological Association’s online instructions for  journal authors 
set out strict and specific allowances for quotation; single text extracts 
shorter than four hundred words, or a series of extracts shorter than eight 
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hundred, constitute the association’s fair use limit; the instructions advise 
authors to seek permission for any longer extracts (“”). Major authors 
have weighed in on public copyright debates with statements that antago-
nize educators (as in Access Copyright’s   video “©anadian Writers 
Speak Out”) or evince a disturbing unfamiliarity with copyright law (see 
Knopf on Margaret Atwood’s misrepresentations of “fair dealing”). Several 
organizations post guidelines for copyright and fair dealing that are far 
more conservative than the law allows; for example, the ’s  Fair 
Dealing Policy, which many universities have adopted, arbitrarily imposes 
a limit of “up to  of a copyright protected work” ( ), despite the 
absence of any such quantification in the legal language of fair dealing. 
Amidst the globalized changes taking place in the copyright regime and 
the more specific uncertainties surrounding educational copying and refer-
ence practices, uncertainty and litigation-averse conservatism about fair 
dealing prevail in Canadian universities and affiliated institutions.
To counter the kind of claims and arguments that corporate rights 
holders and intermediaries like Access Copyright have used to divide 
authors and educators (Doctorow), three points are worth making. First, 
the history discussed here has focused on prototypical practices of fair 
dealing by major authors because they model this practice for authors and 
educators alike (particularly for English teachers, to whom the subject 
authors are well known). Second, rights holders routinely pursue actions 
against other authors and creators, not just against critics and educators: 
in the fall of , the estate of William Faulkner sued Sony Pictures for a 
nine-word misquotation from Faulkner’s  Requiem for a Nun, used in 
Woody Allen’s  film Midnight in Paris (Masnick “Faulkner”). Rights 
holders single out neither critics and educators, nor parties perceived to 
have deep pockets (as the Jammie 3omas case shows [Sandoval]), but liti-
gate far more indiscriminately, as evinced by the proliferation of copyright 
“trolls” (law firms that scour the Internet for litigation opportunities) and 
anti-infringement software that automatically blocks the online distribu-
tion of copyrighted content (as dramatized in the abrupt shutdown of 
the  Hugo Awards webcast; see Newitz). 3ird, the globalized hege-
mony of neoliberalism, with its ruthless structural suppression of the arts 
and humanities—of social critique—on pretenses of “fiscal responsibil-
ity” means that authors and educators have far more common cause for 
solidarity and collaboration than differences over copyright regulation. 
3e potential consequences of these varied but related chill effects 
over quotation and appropriation in contemporary art and knowledge 
production are considerable (as even a cursory browse of Chillingeffects.org 
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suggests; the site monitors legal actions, like cease-and-desist letters, over 
Internet activity). Legal scholars and users’ rights advocates like Michael 
Geist, James Boyle, and Jeffrey Galin point out that fair use and fair dealing 
only stay on the books if they get regular, vigorous exercise. Failure to do 
so is to risk losing this user’s right altogether, under the persistent pres-
sure of rights-holder lobbying and litigation. 3is increasingly chilly and 
jittery climate that surrounds copying in cultural and knowledge produc-
tion, and in teaching and research, makes recent rulings in Canada and 
the U.S. all the more welcome as assertions of fair dealing that entrench 
it as a robust user’s right, toward restoring balance in copyright law. In 
Cambridge v. Georgia State (), a group of major academic publish-
ers sought an order against Georgia State University for the unlicensed 
copying of text excerpts for teaching purposes; the court found this copy-
ing constitutes permissible fair use (Knopf, “Georgia”). Later in , the 
Supreme Court of Canada issued decisions in five copyright cases concern-
ing collecting societies and fair dealing. In some cases, collecting societies 
pursued actions against various businesses and institutions as attempts 
to curb, if not redefine, fair dealing. In other cases, institutions pursued 
actions against the collecting societies: Alberta (Education) et al. v. Access 
Copyright saw every province and territory except Quebec take on Access 
Copyright () for a K- educational copying tariff.
In all five cases, far from curbing fair dealing, the Supreme 
Court decided emphatically in favour of fair dealing as a user’s 
right, “reaffirm[ing],” as  says, “the right to copy portions 
of materials without permission or payment for non-commer-
cial research and education purposes.” 3is year’s “quintet” of 
decisions reinforce a large and liberal interpretation of study 
and research, as well as fair dealing itself; in addition, they 
introduce the principle of technological neutrality in copyright 
(meaning no differences among media, e.g. between print and 
digital, should apply in copyright law). (McCutcheon “Copy-
right quintent”)
In addition, the Canadian government’s long-awaited copyright reform act, 
Bill -, is now law and provides important entrenchments and expan-
sions of fair dealing as a user’s right. 3ese gains are mitigated, however, 
by “anti-circumvention” provisions that prohibit users from circumvent-
ing digital rights management () or the other technological protec-
tion measures (s) commonly found on items like e-books, s, 
and smartphones, despite the many lawful purposes for doing so (Geist 
“3e case” ). 3e new language of technological neutrality in the  
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Supreme Court decisions may trump the bill’s anti-circumvention provi-
sions (Geist “Beyond”). While this difference between legal ruling and 
legislation remains an open question for now, it shows that contradictions 
abide in copyright regulation and that fair dealing is finally gaining lever-
age to restore balance in the copyright regime, which has too long favoured 
rights holders over and against users, audiences, and consumers. It is up 
to educators and cultural producers alike to exercise the new gains in fair 
dealing, and the reasons for doing so are legion, advancing broader public 
interests in the face of a neoliberal government that is actively attacking 
Canadians’ “social literacy” and “manufacturing ignorance” (Brodie). 
Without fair dealing, the “breathing room” it affords innovation brings 
us one step closer to the return of perpetual copyright and the fossilization 
of the public domain, which would represent a dire impoverishment of 
public culture and intellectual life. As critics and scholars of creative works, 
we have no less a responsibility than that of the courts to assert fair dealing, 
to quote critically and confidently, and to legitimize licensing alternatives 
like Open Access, in the service of a “large and liberal” research imagina-
tion and a better balance in copyright between users’ and rights holders’ 
interests. Today’s predominantly corporate rights holders must not be 
allowed the complete control over the means of cultural production that 
is the implied end of every new trade talk or legislation in which copyright 
is put on the table. In that end is also the end of cultural diversity and 
freedom of any expression not amenable to the venal economic orthodoxy 
of neoliberalism. So “come, writers and critics who prophesize with your 
pen, and keep your eyes wide. 3e chance won’t come again.”⁴
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